Shuttle analysis lacked key details: investigators Snafu over taking photos in space led to incomplete model

HOUSTON--A computer model that convinced NASA the Columbiaastronauts were in no danger from damage done to the shuttle by apiece of falling debris was outdated and lacked the rightinformation, the accident investigators said Tuesday.

The analysis by Boeing Co. engineers concluded that little harmwas done to Columbia's left wing by a chunk of hardened foam thatcame off the fuel tank during liftoff. It was a crucial element inbelief by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration that theseven astronauts would return safely.

But the analytical model had never been used before to predictdamage from falling debris during an actual shuttle flight, saidformer astronaut Sally Ride, one of the board's newest members.

What's more, a team of engineers involved in the study realizedthey needed more data. They asked NASA officials to seek pictures ofthe orbiting shuttle, but no pictures were ever taken, Ride said.

In the two months since the disaster, attention has focused onflyaway foam insulation as a major suspect in causing the breach inColumbia's left wing. Superheated gases entered the wing, causing theshuttle to break apart over Texas on its way to a Florida landing.

NASA's video of the launch debris striking the wing was not clearenough. The engineers needed to know more about the speed andlocation of where the falling foam hit on the wing and the size ofthe foam itself, in order to properly assess the potential damage.

"If you had given them good information to start with, they couldhave given you an answer," she told reporters, referring to theanalytical program used by engineers to assess damage. "But therewasn't enough information. So you're asking them to predict wheresomething's going to hit but you can't tell them how it started."

All the unknowns "led this whole group to say, 'Get us more data,get us some photos."'

Speaking after Tuesday's hearing into the cause of the accident,Ride said the request for photos came out of a meeting that occurredJan. 21--just five days after Columbia was struck by foam.

"It looks as though it was literally a miscommunication," Ridesaid, "where one group was saying, 'Let's wait until the analysis iscomplete to see whether we need photos' and then that was interpretedas, 'There will be no photos.' In other cases, it was for differentreasons. It's a pretty complex story. It's a real web ofinterpersonal communications."

Ride said this web apparently stretched even up to the astronautsaboard Columbia, who accepted the engineers' conclusion that theywould be in no danger during their descent through the atmosphere onFeb. 1.

That conclusion by Boeing engineers, after just a week or so ofanalysis, was accepted by virtually everyone. But other companyengineers testified earlier Tuesday that the space shuttles' outerthermal protection layers were never meant to be struck by anythingstronger than perhaps bugs or rain--certainly not a 2-pound piece offoam.

NASA became accustomed to the more than 140 debris strikes thatoccurred on every flight. Such damage was viewed as a nuisance thatcalled for more maintenance, these engineers told the board. But thedamage wasn't always caused by flyaway foam. AP

Shuttle analysis lacked key details: investigators Snafu over taking photos in space led to incomplete model

HOUSTON--A computer model that convinced NASA the Columbiaastronauts were in no danger from damage done to the shuttle by apiece of falling debris was outdated and lacked the rightinformation, the accident investigators said Tuesday.

The analysis by Boeing Co. engineers concluded that little harmwas done to Columbia's left wing by a chunk of hardened foam thatcame off the fuel tank during liftoff. It was a crucial element inbelief by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration that theseven astronauts would return safely.

But the analytical model had never been used before to predictdamage from falling debris during an actual shuttle flight, saidformer astronaut Sally Ride, one of the board's newest members.

What's more, a team of engineers involved in the study realizedthey needed more data. They asked NASA officials to seek pictures ofthe orbiting shuttle, but no pictures were ever taken, Ride said.

In the two months since the disaster, attention has focused onflyaway foam insulation as a major suspect in causing the breach inColumbia's left wing. Superheated gases entered the wing, causing theshuttle to break apart over Texas on its way to a Florida landing.

NASA's video of the launch debris striking the wing was not clearenough. The engineers needed to know more about the speed andlocation of where the falling foam hit on the wing and the size ofthe foam itself, in order to properly assess the potential damage.

"If you had given them good information to start with, they couldhave given you an answer," she told reporters, referring to theanalytical program used by engineers to assess damage. "But therewasn't enough information. So you're asking them to predict wheresomething's going to hit but you can't tell them how it started."

All the unknowns "led this whole group to say, 'Get us more data,get us some photos."'

Speaking after Tuesday's hearing into the cause of the accident,Ride said the request for photos came out of a meeting that occurredJan. 21--just five days after Columbia was struck by foam.

"It looks as though it was literally a miscommunication," Ridesaid, "where one group was saying, 'Let's wait until the analysis iscomplete to see whether we need photos' and then that was interpretedas, 'There will be no photos.' In other cases, it was for differentreasons. It's a pretty complex story. It's a real web ofinterpersonal communications."

Ride said this web apparently stretched even up to the astronautsaboard Columbia, who accepted the engineers' conclusion that theywould be in no danger during their descent through the atmosphere onFeb. 1.

That conclusion by Boeing engineers, after just a week or so ofanalysis, was accepted by virtually everyone. But other companyengineers testified earlier Tuesday that the space shuttles' outerthermal protection layers were never meant to be struck by anythingstronger than perhaps bugs or rain--certainly not a 2-pound piece offoam.

NASA became accustomed to the more than 140 debris strikes thatoccurred on every flight. Such damage was viewed as a nuisance thatcalled for more maintenance, these engineers told the board. But thedamage wasn't always caused by flyaway foam. AP